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Abstract 
This study analyzes the effects of six different credit rating announcements on 
systematic and unsystematic risk in Spanish companies listed on the Electronic 
Continuous Stock Market from 1988 to 2010. We use an extension of the event study 
dummy approach that includes direct effects on beta risk and on volatility. We find 
effects in both kinds of risk, indicating that rating agencies provide information to the 
market. Rating actions that imply an improvement in credit quality cause lower 
systematic and unsystematic risk. Conversely, ratings announcements that imply credit 
quality deterioration cause a rebalance in both types of risk, with higher beta risk being 
joined with lower diversifiable risk. Although the event characteristics were not 
important to determine how the two types of risk reacted to rating actions, the 2007 
economic and financial crises increase the market’s sensitivity to these characteristics.  
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1. Introduction 
The role of Rating agencies as providers of information is a central matter to 
market participants and regulators. Hence, the analysis of the effects of rating changes 
on financial markets is crucial. Even more now, when these agencies are under scrutiny 
after their failure to predict the crises at such firms as WorldCom in 2002 and Lehman 
Brothers in 2008 and for their central role in the sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
All substantive changes in the performance of a firm should trigger alterations 
in Rating agencies’ views on the solvency of the firm and the rating they assigned. 
These changes may also alter the investors’ views on valuation and risk of the firm. 
Under the assumption that the CAPM is the suitable model for asset pricing, the 
systematic (non-diversifiable or beta-) risk can be viewed as a measure of organizational 
effectiveness. Both risk and rating are sources of information regarding the 
organization’s worth. Consequently, it is expected that beta risk will be linked with 
credit rating (Abad and Robles, 2006). 
On the other hand, investors are also concerned with the unsystematic 
(diversifiable, idiosyncratic) risk of the firms. This risk is essential in derivatives pricing 
as the value of a derivative is a function of total risk of the underlying (Hilliard and 
Savickas, 2002), and it is important for under-diversified portfolio management too 
(Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu, 2001, Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003 or Angelidis 
and Tessaromati, 2009). We can therefore inquire if there is also a connection between 
credit rating and diversifiable risk.  
While the effect of rating changes on stock prices is a well-developed area of 
study (see Dichev and Piotroski, 2001 or Abad and Robles, 2007), the analysis of the 
effect of rating changes on risk is almost unexplored. We only find the studies of Abad 
and Robles (2006) and Impson, Karafiath and Glascock (1992). These authors analyze 
the effect of rating changes on systematic risk in stock markets. Amazingly, we do not 
find any work about the relationship between unsystematic risk and credit rating 
changes. Our main purpose here is to extend the existing research on the effect of 
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credit rating changes on stock markets, thereby filling this gap in the empirical 
literature.  
This paper studies the effects of credit rating actions on both types of risk for 
the re-rated firms with a special emphasis on their unsystematic risk. We build on the 
analysis presented in Abad and Robles (2006) and focus on the effects of rating changes 
on the unsystematic risks of the re-rated firms. Abad and Robles (2006) find rating 
changes are related to changes in beta risk. They find lower levels of systematic risk for 
both downgrades and upgrades. Although they do not examine the unsystematic risk 
component of total risk, they conclude that downgrades are associated with a 
rebalancing of risks. In this study, we present evidence regarding the effect of rating 
changes on unsystematic risk. We improve the analysis allowing for direct effects of 
rating action announcements on the volatility of returns as well as on the beta risk and 
on the returns.   
Instead of a traditional two-step event study, we present an extension of the 
dummy-variable regression approach, allowing for changes in the parameters of the 
market model. We consider different scenarios for the volatility of returns, which is 
specified either as a constant process or with an autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity process. We analyze rating changes for Spanish companies listed on 
the Electronic Continuous Stock Market. We distinguish between different types of 
rating action announcements (effective rating changes, placement on the credit watch 
list and outlook notices) to analyze their informative content. We use daily returns of 
the re-rated companies between June 1988 and December 2010.  
In this study, we also explore the cross-sectional variation in both types of risk 
responses to rating changes. To study these responses, we focus on characteristics of the 
rating action, the issuing firm and the economic environment, also giving special 
attention to the effects of the economic and financial crisis that began in 2007.  
In the next section, we present the evolution and characteristics of the rating 
changes in the Spanish market. The modeling and testing strategies are described in 
section 3. The main results are presented in sections 4 and 5. The paper closes with 
several conclusions in section 6. 
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2. Rating action announcement on the Spanish Stock Market 
Our initial sample of announcements contains a set of 482 rating actions 
corresponding to the “Big Three” rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s) during the period from June 1988 to December 2010. These actions include 
effective rating changes, rating reviews and outlook reports1. Fitch and Moody’s 
provide us with their announcement dates. We also examine Reuters to find the rating 
announcement dates of the S&P and complementary information. 
Table 1 presents the rating action announcements grouped into six different 
types of announcement (effective upgrades/downgrades, review for 
upgrades/downgrades and positive/negative outlook reports) and into three different 
rating agencies. We use the previous information to distinguish between contaminated 
and uncontaminated rating changes. As is usual in the literature, we consider rating 
changes to be contaminated if during the previous 30 trading days, any firm-specific 
rating event that may cause abnormal behavior took place. In our sample, 96 rating 
changes are contaminated, more than 21% of the negative rating announcements and 
more than 16% of the positive announcements. After filtering for contaminated events, 
our final sample has 386 rating action announcements.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Focusing on the agency, Table 1 also shows the distribution of rating action per 
rating agency. Moody’s released 42.5% of the rating actions, Fitch released 30.7%, and 
the remaining 26.8% were released by S&P. Furthermore, the distribution of the 
contaminated announcements is 47% from Moody’s, 34% from Fitch and 19% from 
S&P. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
                                                            
1 Reviews or additions to the watch list occur after special events (e.g., changes in regulation, 
unexpected changes in management or merger announcements), indicating that the rating is 
under review for a likely change in a short period of time. Outlooks indicate the 
creditworthiness trend in a medium-term timeframe. 
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Figure 1 presents the distribution of rating actions per year and per type of 
announcement (positive or negative). In general, the yearly number of rating 
announcements increases during the sample period. The yearly number of rating 
changes increases during whole period with a slight decline in 2004. However, the most 
important information in this figure is that after recent market crises, the dot-com 
crash in 2001 and the subprime crisis in 2008, there was a significant increase in rating 
changes with a high percentage of negative rating announcements (88% negative in 
2002 and 98% in 2009). 
Figure 2 depicts the number of rating actions by the sector of the credit issuing 
firm. As seen, the majority of changes affected the financial sector (49.5%). In Spain, 
the majority of firms that issue corporate bonds are in the financial sector. The energy 
sector accounts for the second-most rating changes, with 30.3% of the total changes, 
followed by the telecommunications and the consumer cyclical sectors with 8.1% each 
one and the capital goods sector with 7.7%. 
 
3. Modeling and testing strategy 
Firm total risk should be associated with credit ratings because both are a 
measure of firm wealth. Therefore, we expect that rating change announcements must 
be followed by changes in risk. Any movement in firm total risk may be caused by a 
change in systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk or both. In the first case, we expect that 
rating changes will be accompanied by changes in the market beta. In the second case, 
we expect changes in volatility. In both cases, the change must be positive for 
downgrades and negative for upgrades. In the third case, both kinds of risk must 
change in an unknown direction because there must be a risk rebalancing.   
To test this hypothesis, we consider the possibility that a debt rating change 
could exert a destabilizing influence on beta, which is the measure of the firm’s 
systematic risk, by specifying the following model: 
 it i i mt si s si s mt itR R D D Ra b g l e= + + + + , (1) 
 5 
 
where the rating action announcement is t=0, itR  is the return2 on stock i at time t 
from day -250 to day +T; mtR  is the return on the market index at time t, which we 
calculate using an equal weight index; sD is a dummy variable taking on the value of 
one for the days in the event window s=(L, T) and zero otherwise. 
In model (1), ia  represents the average daily amount by which the stock 
outperformed the benchmark portfolio on days -250 through L and i sia g+  is the 
average daily amount by which the stock outperformed the benchmark portfolio in the 
event window.3 Similarly, ib  is the stock’s beta with respect to the benchmark 
portfolio on days -250 through L and i s ib l+  is the stock’s beta with respect to the 
benchmark portfolio on the event window. Finally, ite  is the error term and var( )ite is 
the unsystematic risk of the firm i. The model must be estimated for each firm and for 
the whole sample.  
We can write the variance of the relationship in Equation (1) as 
 
2var( ) var( ) var( )it i mt itR Rd e= + , (2) 
where id  is i sib l+  in the event window and ib  outside the event window. Equation 
(2) shows the total risk of asset i can be partitioned into two parts: systematic risk, 
2 var( )i mtRd , which is a measure of how the asset covaries with the economy and 
unsystematic risk, var( )ite , which is independent of the economy.  
To analyze the effect of credit rating change announcements on firm risk, we 
have to consider the two components of risk in Equation (2). The hypothesis that a 
                                                            
2 Returns are calculated as
1
100it itit
it
P d
R Ln
P -
+æ ö÷ç= ÷ç ÷è ø , where itP  is the price of the stock of firm i 
on day t and itd  is the dividend formally announced on day t. The data on stock prices from 
the Spanish Electronic Continuous Stock Market are daily closing prices corrected for stock 
splits, equity offerings and merger effects. 
3 Model (1) allows for changes in the constant component of expected returns, as well as for 
changes in beta risk. Therefore, we endow the model with more flexibility to avoid that 
misspecifications of the mean return could affect the variance of the error term. Results for the 
constant component of model (1) are not shown in this paper to save space but are available 
upon request. 
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credit rating change conveys information to the market about a change in the firm’s 
systematic risk implies that 0sil ¹ . Comparing the statistical properties of 
var( )ite inside and outside the event window, we can explore the effect of rating 
changes on unsystematic risk. 
a) Test for systematic risk effects 
To draw inferences for the systematic component of risk, the estimated variable, 
sil , or Cumulative Change in Beta (CCB) for firm i in event window s, is used to find 
the Cumulative Average Change in Beta (CACB) for a specific event window s.  
 
1
1 N
s si
i
CACB
N
l
=
= å
,
 (3) 
where N is the number of rating changes in the sample. 
The null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance due to rating action 
announcements implies that CACB must be zero. To test the statistical significance of 
the CACB, we use a standard t-test. Non-normality (skewness, fat tails) can affect the 
properties of this parametric test. To overcome this problem, we compute two 
nonparametric tests. First, we use the Fisher-sign test. This test counts the number of 
times that CCB is positive. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic follows a 
binomial distribution with p=0.5. Second, the Wilcoxon-signed-rank test is computed. 
This test assumes that there is information in the magnitudes, as well as the signs. To 
calculate the statistic, we take the series of CCB variables and rank them from smallest 
to largest by absolute value. Next, we add the ranks associated with positive values. We 
report p-values for the asymptotic normal approximation to the test. See Sheskin (1997) 
for details. 
b) Test for unsystematic risk effects 
We consider different scenarios for var( )ite  in model (1): constant variance; 
time-dependent variance and time-dependent variance with the direct effect of rating 
change in the variance equation. 
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1. Constant volatility approach  
In a first step, we assume a constant variance in model (1), 2var( )it ie s= , and 
test the structural change hypothesis, i.e., the rating action announcement causes a 
change in the variance level. To test this hypothesis, we compute the Variance Ratio 
(VR1) for asset i as 
2
2
ˆ
1
ˆ
is
is
io
VR
s
s= , where 
2
iˆss  and 2iˆos are the sample mean variance 
estimated inside and outside the event window, respectively. VR1 =1 indicates that the 
event has no effect, while VR1 > 1 implies the event increase in unsystematic 
volatility. Therefore, if the volatility of the event window significantly exceeds the one 
implied by the model, an event impact on unsystematic volatility is observed. The null 
hypothesis of no abnormal performance due to rating changes implies that VR1 must be 
equal to one. To test this hypothesis, we compute a standard F test and two 
nonparametric tests (Siegel-Tukey and Bartlett tests) for each event in our sample. 
We also define the Average Variance Ratio (AVR1) as 
 
2
2
1
ˆ1
1
ˆ
N
is
s
ioi
AVR
N
s
s=
= å
,
 (4) 
and we test the AVR1=1 hypothesis with the Fisher-sign and Wilcoxon-signed-rank 
tests.  
2. GJR-GARCH volatility approach   
In the second scenario, we assume time-dependent variance, var( )it ithe = ; in 
model (1) that can be modeled by an appropriate GARCH model. The most general 
model that we consider is a GJR-GARCH model: 
  2 2
0 1 2 3
1 1 1
~ (0, )

   
  
     
it it
Q QP
it i iq it q ip it p iq t p it q
q p q
N h
h h S

        (5) 
 
To test the hypothesis that the rating action announcement causes a change in 
the variance level, we compute the Variance Ratio (VR2) for asset i as 
ˆ
2
ˆ
is
is
io
h
VR
h
=  
where iˆsh  and iˆoh are the sample mean of conditional variance estimated inside and 
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outside the event window, respectively.4 We also define the Average Variance Ratio 
(AVR2) as 
 
1
ˆ1
2
ˆ
N
is
s
i io
h
AVR
N h=
= å
,
 (6) 
and we test the AVR2=1 hypothesis with the Fisher-sign and Wilcoxon-signed-rank 
tests. 
At an event day t, two different types of factors may determine the level of 
unsystematic volatility: security-specific factors that are captured by the model 
formulated above and event specific-factors that are ignored here. Following Hilliard 
and Savickas (2002), their impact can be measured by the ratio λ of the cross-sectional 
variance of the estimated residuals of the market model and its conditional variance 
implied by the GARCH process: 
 
2
1
1 2
1
ˆ ˆ1
1
1
ˆ ˆ( 2) 1
N
it jtN
j
t N
i
it jt
j
N
N
N N h N h
e e
l =
=
=
æ ö÷ç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷çè ø= - - +
å
å
å
 (7) 
In this context, the estimator of the Average Variance Ratio (AVR2) in the 
event window is 
 
1
2
T
s t
t L
AVR
T L
l l
=
= - å  (8) 
We compute the adjusted tests proposed by Hilliard and Savickas (2002), CHS-
test ahead, to test the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance due to rating 
changes (=1 and AVR2=1).  
3. Dummy GJR-GARCH volatility approach 
Finally, in the third scenario, we take into account the possibility that a credit 
rating change could have a direct effect on the idiosyncratic risk. We include in the 
                                                            
4 In this case, we do not test the hypothesis of zero abnormal performance due to rating changes 
(VR2 =1) at the individual level because the distribution of the mean-variance ratio is 
unknown. 
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variance model the dummy variable, stD , defined above, which indicates if day t is in 
the event window: 
 2 2
0 1 2 3
1 1 1
~ (0, )

   
  
      
it it
Q QP
it i iq it q ip it p iq t p it q si s
q p q
N h
h h S D

        (9) 
If a debt rating change adds new information about a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, 
then 0sid ¹ . To test the hypothesis of no abnormal performance due to rating action 
announcements, we use the estimated sid  or Cumulative Change in Idiosyncratic Risk 
(CCIR) for firm i in event window s, to find the Cumulative Average Change in 
Idiosyncratic Risk (CACIR) for a specific event window s.  
 
1
1 N
s si
i
CACIR
N
d
=
= å  (10) 
To test the statistical significance of the CACIR, we use the t-ratio test, the 
Fisher-sign test and the Wilcoxon-signed-rank test again. 
We study the existence of a structural change in both kinds of risk (systematic 
and unsystematic) by analyzing three kinds of event window. We analyze the impact of 
rating changes by looking at (a) five symmetric windows around the announcement 
date: [-1,1], [-5,5], [-10,10], [-15,15] and [-30,30]; (b) four post-event windows: [1,5], 
[1,10], [1,15] and [1,30] and (c) four pre-event windows: [-5,-1], [-10,-1], [-15,-1] and [-
30,-1]. Thus, we can detect possible effects and determine when they happen. 
 
4. Rating events effects 
4.1. Improvements in credit quality 
We first consider the impact of the three types of announcements for improved 
credit quality rating actions, i.e., actual rating changes, rating reviews and outlook 
assignments, on systematic and non-systematic risk. We analyze the different volatility 
scenarios, i.e., constant volatility (Table 2), GJR-GARCH volatility (Table 3) and 
dummy GJR-GARCH volatility (Table 4). In Table 2, we present the results for 
systematic risk (left panel) and for non-systematic risk (right panel). The systematic risk 
panel shows limited effects for any kind of rating action. The mean estimated change in 
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beta is significant when we consider outlook reports, while the median is significant when 
we consider effective changes and reviews. When the estimated change in beta is 
significant, it is generally negative, indicating a decline in systematic risk. 
[Insert Table 2] 
In the case of unsystematic risk, when we consider effective upgrades the evidence 
of a change in variance at an individual level is not clear. Although the average variance 
ratio (AVR1) is greater than one in the three largest symmetric and pre-event windows, 
the F-test rejects the null at a slightly higher percentage than 50%, the Siegel-Tukey 
test’s rejection percentages are always lower than 50% and the Bartlett percentage is 
sometimes higher than 50% and sometimes lower. Conversely, the median-variance ratio 
(M-VR1) is lower than one in all windows, indicating a decrease in the unsystematic risk 
level and this effect is always significant with both nonparametric tests. 
In the case of positive outlook reports, the results for the average variance ratio 
are similar: there is no evidence of changes in variance. However, the median-variance 
ratio is always significantly lower than one and decreases with the size of the window. 
The results regarding the mean and median-variance ratio are similar for reviews as for 
upgrades, but the median is significantly lower than one in the narrower windows.  
Table 3 shows results for rating actions that imply an improvement of credit 
quality of the firms in the second scenario, i.e., when we assume a time-dependent 
variance estimated from the GJR-GARCH model.5 The mean estimated change in beta 
risk is significantly negative, as in the constant variance scenario, except in the case of 
positive outlook reports for the [-10,10], [-10,-1] and [1,10] windows and the effective 
upgrades for the largest window (see left panel).  
[Insert Table 3] 
With respect to the unsystematic risk (right panel of Table 3), for all three kinds 
of improvement in credit ratings, the average variance ratio (AVR2) is greater than one, 
                                                            
5 In scenarios with conditional variance, we estimate models by QML. We consider all of the 
models nested by the GJR-GARCH (including ARCH and GARCH of different orders) and 
estimate the best model for each event in the sample. 
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but there is no evidence of a change in variance at the individual level. We find that VR2 
is greater than one in less than 50% of cases. However, the median-variance ratio is 
always lower than one. For effective upgrades and positive outlook reports, the median-
variance ratio is significant using the sign test and the rank test in all windows, except 
the largest window. This result indicates a decrease in the unsystematic risk level. For 
the Reviews for upgrades, the result is the same, but the median is significant only in the 
pre-event and post-event windows and the largest symmetric window. Finally, despite 
the fact that the  is lower than one, we do not reject the null hypothesis of zero 
abnormal performance due to rating changes with the tests proposed by Hilliard and 
Savickas (2002) because the rejection rate (=1) is always lower than 20%, considering 
all three rating actions, and the CHS test never rejects the null hypothesis (AVR2=1). 
Table 4 shows the results for the third scenario, the dummy conditional volatility 
approach, where the effect of a rating action on unsystematic risk is captured using a 
dummy variable’s parameter in the GJR-GARCH model. The systematic risk panel 
shows that for any type of rating action, the mean of estimated change in beta is not 
significant for all event windows, except those three windows that are significant for 
negative outlooks in the second scenario. In these windows, the mean of the estimated 
change in beta is significant and negative. However, the nonparametric test detects 
effects on the median of the estimated change in beta in the three different rating 
actions. For effective upgrades, the effect is always significant and negative in all 
windows, except the largest window where the effect is significantly positive. For positive 
outlooks, the effect is significantly negative in general, except in the largest post-event 
window. For positive reviews, the effect is significant and positive in larger windows and 
significantly negative in narrower windows, regardless of the symmetric or non-symmetric 
type. In general, we detect decreases in non-diversifiable risk.  
[Insert Table 4] 
Regarding the non-systematic risk (see right panel of Table 4), for effective 
upgrades, the Cumulative Average Change in Idiosyncratic Risk is negative and 
significant with the t-ratio or the nonparametric test in the majority of windows. Positive 
outlook reports have a similar effect. Reviews for upgrade have the same result for the 
median but in only three cases, the narrowest symmetric, pre- and post-event windows. 
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Overall, we find that announcements about improvements of credit quality have a 
statistically significant impact on both risks. These announcements are associated with 
statistically significant reductions in beta risk in a few windows, and these effects are 
clearer in the more flexible scenario, which is the dummy GJR-GARCH approach. This 
result is in line with the result in Abad and Robles (2006). In addition, we detect 
significant reductions in non-systematic risk regardless of the kind of announcement and 
scenario, and these findings are clearer with the effective upgrades and positive outlook 
reports announcements. This result is detected with the nonparametric tests only, 
implying a right-skewed distribution of abnormal non-systematic risk.6 This evidence 
indicates that there is a reduction in the total risk of the firm because we detect a lower 
level of both kinds of risk: diversifiable and non-diversifiable.  
4.2. Deteriorations in credit quality 
First, we analyze results from the constant volatility approach. Table 5 shows 
results for rating actions that imply deterioration of firms’ credit quality. As observed 
in the systematic risk panel, for any kind of rating action, the mean of the estimated 
change in beta is positive for all event windows. This finding may indicate increases in 
systematic risk. In the case of effective downgrades, the effect is only significant in the 
[-15,15] symmetric window, the [-30,-1] pre-event window and in the three largest post-
event windows. For negative outlook reports, this effect is significant in all the windows 
except the [-1,1]. The rating review events have a significant effect for three symmetric 
windows and several pre- and post-event windows. These results indicate that rating 
refinements are more informative than the effective rating downgrades. The median 
change in volatility is always positive, although the nonparametric tests do not detect 
any significance. 
[Insert Table 5]  
The results for unsystematic risk are shown in the right panel of Table 5. When there 
is an effective ratings downgrade, the evidence for changes in variance at individual 
level is ambiguous. Although the average variance ratio is greater than one in the 
                                                            
6 This asymmetric distribution implies a greater frequency of negative values, but the positive 
values are larger, keeping the sample mean at zero. 
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fourth biggest symmetric windows and in two of the pre-event ones, the F-test rejects 
the null in slightly more than the 50% of the time, the Siegel-Tukey’s rejection 
percentage is always lower than 50%, and the Bartlett test shows a percentage larger 
than 50% for the biggest windows. Conversely, the median of the variance ratio is 
always lower than one, indicating a decrease in the unsystematic risk level. This effect 
is significant with the sign test, the rank test or both.  
 The results for the average variance ratio are almost identical for outlooks and 
rating reviews. AVR1 generally returns a value greater than one with uncertain 
evidence of structural change with the three individual tests. For the negative outlook 
reports, the median-variance ratio is always lower than one but only significant in the 
[-1,1] window, the asymmetric pre-event windows and the narrowest post-event 
window. This evidence seems to point to a decrease in volatility, indicating some degree 
of anticipation by the market. For review for downgrades, we find similar effects but 
for the post-event windows, indicating that the decrease in volatility persists until 30 
days after the announcement. However, for symmetrical windows, except [-1,1], the 
median-variance ratio is over one. The rank test rejects the null in these cases, 
indicating an increase in volatility around the announcement of inclusions to the credit 
watch list.  
[Insert Table 6] 
In Table 6, we present results for the GJR-GARCH volatility approach. The 
results for systematic risk are similar to those found in the constant variance approach. 
We find a positive mean estimated change in beta in all windows and all kinds of rating 
events, indicating an increase of market risk. The effect is not significant for effective 
downgrades, but it is always significant for negative outlook reports, excluding the [-
1,1] window. For reviews for downgrade, the effect is significant for all but five 
windows. However, though the estimated median VR2 is positive at all times, we never 
reject the null hypothesis with the two nonparametric tests.  
As shown in the unsystematic risk panel of Table 6, the estimated average 
variance ratio is greater than one independent of the type of rating action and in 
almost the whole set of windows. However, the percentage of times the variance ratio is 
greater than one is clearly lower than 40% for effective downgrades and approximately 
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50% for outlooks and reviews. The median-variance ratio is significantly lower than one 
in every event window using both non-parametric tests. Despite the fact that the VR2 
estimated by the Hilliard and Savickas (2002) is lower than one in all cases, the two 
applied tests failed to detect any downgrade effects on diversifiable risk. 
We find similar results for the negative outlook reports. The median VR2 is 
lower than one, except for the [-30,30], [-15,15] and [1,15] windows. The nonparametric 
tests only detect lower levels of volatility in the smallest symmetric window, the three 
smallest pre-event windows and the smallest post-event window. In this case, AVR2l is 
lower than one for all windows except for the fourth biggest symmetric one. The CHS-
tests do not reject the null hypothesis in any of the cases. 
To complete our analysis of the second volatility measurement approach, for 
those firms put on review for downgrades we find evidence of an increase in volatility 
after the inclusion on the watch list, as in the constant volatility case. In this case, the 
median VR2 is greater than one and significant in all symmetrical windows and for 
three pre-event windows. The CHS-tests also fail to reject the null hypothesis in this 
case. 
 Finally, we analyze the dummy GJR-GARCH approach (Table 7), where the 
effect of the rating action announcement on unsystematic risk is captured by the d 
parameter in equation (9). In this case, we also find increments in systematic risk 
because CACB3 are positives in general. They are non-significant for effective 
downgrades, clearly significant in the case of negative outlook reports, except for [-1,1], 
and only significant in several symmetrical and asymmetrical windows for those 
companies under review for downgrade.  
[Insert Table 7]  
When we look at the unsystematic risk panel in Table 7, we find that for 
effective downgrades, CACIR estimation is positive but non-significant in general, while 
it is negative and clearly significant in [-1,1] and the narrower post-event windows. 
Nevertheless, the median CIR is negative except for [-30,30], and the null hypothesis is 
rejected in the majority of cases with nonparametric tests. For negative outlook 
reports, the mean value of the estimated d is negative for [-1,1] and all asymmetrical 
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windows. The median CIR is also negative in general, and it is significant for the same 
set of event windows as in the case of CACIR. In the case of review announcements, 
the findings are mixed. We find positive significant CACIR in the symmetric windows, 
except for [-1,1], and in the pre-event windows, but we find negative and significant 
effects in the post-event windows. This result could indicate higher levels of 
diversifiable risk before inclusion on the credit watch list that diminishes in days after 
the announcement. The whole effect, observed in the symmetrical windows, is an 
increase in volatility. The results for the median CIR also agree with this explanation 
as they take positive significant values in the biggest symmetrical and pre-event 
windows but show negative, significant values in [-1,1] and all the post-event windows. 
 To summarize, we always find increments in systematic risk that are clearly 
detected in the more flexible scenario, the dummy GJR-GARCH approach, and are 
more evident in the case of negative outlook reports. There are noticeable decreases in 
unsystematic risk for effective downgrades and negative outlook reports, whereas in the 
case of review for downgrades, we find a net increase in volatility. 
 
5. Determinants of the abnormal risk reaction to rating changes  
In this section, we use regression analysis to study the determinants of risk 
responses to rating changes. We focus on characteristics of the rating, the issuer and 
the economic environment. We expect to find a stronger impact on risk when the 
events provide more information to the market.    
Our previous results report a different reaction of volatility and beta risk after 
different rating action announcements (effective rating changes, outlook reports or 
credit watch listing). Many researchers, such as Altman and Rijken (2007), assert that 
the refinements of a rating, such as outlooks and reviews, may be even more useful 
than effective rating changes in transferring relevant information about the issuers 
default risk to the markets. These events could reflect movements in the risk position of 
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the firm preceding the announcement of the new rating by the agency.7 Therefore, we 
hypothesize a different risk response to these different rating events.  
Similarly, Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2006) stated that the announcement of 
a credit watch probably increases the information content of effective rating changes 
because it discloses more private information. According to this hypothesis, the effect of 
an effective rating change could be different, depending on the presence or absence of a 
prior review process, and the effect is stronger in the first case. To test this hypothesis, 
we define the expected rating changes as those that have been preceded by an 
announcement in the watch listing (66% of cases).  
Many credit issues are rated by more than one agency. In certain situations, we 
can find split ratings related to differences in methodology or the importance that each 
agency gives to certain variables or particular matters. Experts disagree as to why 
agencies give different ratings and which agencies affect prices more. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that the amount of information available in a rating event depends on 
whether it presents the same opinion about the firm default risk as the other two 
agencies. To uncover this information, we define a new term, “consensus rating action”, 
to be a rating action that follows a rating action in the same direction by another 
agency after the announcement (9.01% of the total sample). One may also expect to 
find differential information in rating actions across the three rating agencies. In our 
sample, 41.4% of the rating actions are made by Moody’s; thus, we include an indicator 
variable to distinguish among Moody’s and the other two agencies to test this 
hypothesis. Additionally, as the same issuer can be monitored by one, two or three 
agencies simultaneously, we hypothesize that this monitoring can lead to different 
impacts on issuer risk depending on whether it reflects the opinion of only “one 
agency” (in our sample this is found in 5.44% of the cases).   
As we show in section 3, almost the 50% of firms in our sample are financial 
enterprises, mainly commercial banks. The well-known “too-big-to-fail” paradigm 
suggests that regulators might intervene to avoid the default of large banks because of 
                                                            
7 Reviews give a stronger indication than outlooks concerning future changes in the company 
rating. This rating event indicates that there is a notably high probability that the issuer will 
be rerated. Rating outlooks merely indicate a possible direction for the rating in the medium 
term. The rating outlooks indicate a forecast of the future rating of the firm. 
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serious, adverse effects on the financial system.8 Under this hypothesis, the market may 
be insensitive to rating actions affecting banks. This hypothesis implies lower effects 
from changes in the ratings of financial firms than for firms in other sectors. 
To test these hypotheses, we run a regression of the abnormal risks in the [-1,1] 
window against a set of dummy variables that take on the value 1 (or 0), depending on 
whether the rating announcements involve outlook reports, reviews, expected rating 
changes, Moody’s decision, a single agency decision, consensus rating action or financial 
sector firms. We also analyze a wider post-event window [1,30] to study if there is a 
short-run market reaction or if the reaction persists for 30 days after the 
announcement. We consider abnormal systematic risk and abnormal idiosyncratic risk 
computed in the more flexible scenario (the dummy GJR-GARCH volatility approach). 
We estimate models by OLS with a White heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance 
matrix. We consider a 10% significance level for the tests.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Table 8 shows results for the samples of upgrades and downgrades separately 
and for abnormal systematic and unsystematic risk in the [-1,1] and [1,30] windows. 
The left panel of Table 8 shows results for improvements in credit quality. We find 
that reaction of systematic post-event risk is significantly more negative for expected 
announcements, indicating that ratings upgrades affecting reviewed firms have a lower 
abnormal beta than those not reviewed. This result is compatible with the hypothesis 
of the information content of the credit watch listing stated by Boot, et al. (2006), 
which implies a stronger market response to rating changes preceded by a credit watch 
listing. 
We also find differences among financial companies and the other firms in the 
sample. The reaction of systematic risk of financial enterprises is positive, indicating a 
lower reduction of beta risk in the financial sector in the post-event window. Abad and 
                                                            
8 Major financial firms are assumed to be “too big to fail”. Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail 
on September 15, 2008. However, after that there have been numerous government or central 
bank interventions to avoid banks defaults. Several examples are Fortis (Belgium, Netherland 
and Luxemburg, 2008), Dexia (France and Belgium, 2008), Bradford & Bingley (United 
Kingdom, 2008) and Caja Madrid (Spain, 2010).  
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Robles (2006) also find a different reaction to rating changes for financial companies. 
This result points to the existence of a too-big-to-fail effect.   
The right panel of Table 8 shows results for deteriorations in credit quality. 
These results indicate that none of the analyzed factors have an effect on abnormal 
systematic risk in the [-1,1] window, whereas the stock market reaction is significantly 
less negative for unsystematic risk after the announcement of a review process. As we 
find in section 4, inclusion on a watch listing implies a change in volatility in the 
opposite direction than effective downgrades and outlooks. This result indicates that 
the review process provides a different information regarding movements in the risk 
position of the firm than the other kinds of rating actions. This result was also found in 
Altman and Rijken (2007).   
For the post-event [1,30] window abnormal risks, we do not find any systematic 
risk effects, but announcements by Moody’s have a significantly negative impact on 
idiosyncratic risk. According to this result, this agency seems to have bigger impact on 
the market than the other two. In addition, the reaction of unsystematic risk to a 
downgrade is significantly positively related with the sector of the firm, indicating that 
non-diversifiable risk of financial enterprises responds less negatively. This result is in 
line of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, as we also found for improvements in credit 
quality.    
5.1. Financial crisis effect 
The sample period we analyze covers the recent economic recession. The crisis 
originated with the collapse of the housing bubble. We can date the beginning of the 
financial market tensions to August 2007. This period is characterized by a more 
uncertain informational environment and high increases in volatility of financial 
markets. Several authors find significant differences in rating action effects during the 
financial crisis. For example, Jorion, Liu and Shi (2005) find less negative effects of 
downgrades during the 2001 stock market crisis, and May (2010) finds a more negative 
reaction to downgrades in the US corporate bond market. In our case, we expect that 
the observed increase in the volatility markets after the crisis causes different responses 
to rating actions before and after the crisis began.9 
                                                            
9 Our sample period covers the dot-com crash in 2000, as well. We analyze the crash’s possible 
effect on the reaction of risk to rating changes, but, as in Abad and Robles (2006), we do not 
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At this time, rating agencies are under scrutiny. They failed to predict crises at 
firms such as Lehman Brothers in 2008, and they had a central role in the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (US SEC, 2008) stated 
that the surveillance processes used by these agencies appears to have been less robust 
than their initial ratings processes. The European Parliament (2009) noted that 
agencies failed to reflect worsening market conditions early enough in the ratings, or to 
adjust them in time following the deepening market crisis.10 This conflicting role might 
have led to a loss of reputation. As a consequence, we expect that the market will give 
less credibility to rating actions after the crisis.  
 To test these hypotheses, we split the sample into two sub-samples (before and 
after August 2007) and estimate the models for each subsample. Table 9 shows results 
for deteriorations in credit quality.11 We find important differences in both abnormal 
risk reactions for the [-1,1] window. In the period preceding the financial crisis, we do 
not find significant effects for the analyzed factors. After the crisis began, several 
announcement characteristics are shown to provide important information to the 
market.  
We find the review process has a significant effect on both risks. After August 
2007, the rating effect is negative for systematic risk and positive for volatility, 
indicating a smoother rebalance of risks once the firm is on the watch list. The 
announcement of an outlook report also causes a significantly positive, strong response 
for idiosyncratic risk but does not have any effect on abnormal beta. The reaction of 
both abnormal risks is lower if the announcement is by Moody’s after August 2007, 
indicating that this agency has lost credibility. In addition, we find a stronger, 
significant rebalance of risks for firms monitored by only one agency. The effect of the 
“one-agency” variable is positive for systematic risk and negative for the unsystematic 
risk.   
                                                                                                                                                                              
find any significant difference related to the bursting of the tech bubble. To save space, we do 
not present these results. 
10 See Crouchy et al. (2008) for an analysis of the role played by rating agencies in the sub-
prime mortgage crisis. 
11 In the case of improvements in credit quality, we only have six rating actions after 2007. The 
estimation of the model with the pre-crisis sample yields almost the same results as in the 
whole sample. To save space, these results are not included. 
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 When we analyze the post-event [1,30] abnormal risks, we also find some 
differences between both periods. In the case of systematic risk, before August 2007, 
only the review and expected variables cause significantly positive responses. For the 
unsystematic risk, we only find a significant effect in the financial sector. After August 
2007, we find a lower abnormal unsystematic risk in the case of an announcement by 
Moody’s. We also find the same kind of significant risk rebalancing observed in the [-
1,1] window for less-monitored firms.    
 
6. Conclusions 
Although the effects of rating events on market returns have been amply 
analyzed in the literature, the analysis of their impact on firm risk is almost 
nonexistent, especially in the case of unsystematic risk. This paper tries to fill this gap 
in the literature by studying the reaction of both kinds of risk in a daily sample of 386 
rating action announcements during a period that spans from June 1988 to December 
2010 in the Spanish stock market. We provide empirical evidence that rating changes 
affect both kinds of risk of the re-rated firms.  
We consider a more flexible methodology and a wider sample period than do 
Abad and Robles (2006). Our evidence confirms the existence of the rebalancing-of-
risks effect that Abad and Robles presumed for deteriorations in credit quality. The 
results suggest that the net effects have opposite signs for improvements and 
deteriorations in the credit quality, as we expected. However, while credit quality 
improvements diminish both kinds of risk, the deteriorations in credit quality affect 
both kinds of risk in the opposite directions, showing a rebalancing of risks.  
Additionally, we analyze the relationship among the risk reactions and a set of 
characteristics describing the rating action, the firm and the economic environment. In 
general, we only find different reactions thirty days after the announcement. However, 
results for downgrades are notably sensitive to the time period considered. We do not 
find a different reaction of both risks in the event window before the 2007 financial 
crisis, but after this date, systematic and unsystematic risks are more sensitive to 
rating action and agency characteristics. The economic and financial turmoil seems to 
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have caused a change in investors’ behavior, which is more affected by rating actions’ 
characteristics such as the type of announcement or the credit agency that made it.   
Overall, our results are important because, besides confirming the limited results 
in the literature regarding the relationship between rating actions and beta risk, these 
findings show the existence of a link among rating actions and unsystematic risk, which 
is a previously unexplored issue. This evidence is essential to several areas of financial 
management, including derivatives valuation and under-diversified portfolio 
management. 
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Table 1. Rating action announcements 
 Agency 
 Fitch Moody’s Standard & Poor’s Total 
Negative rating announcements 
Effective Downgrade 70 (19) 59 (16) 42 (10) 171 (45) 
Negative Outlook Assignment 5 (0) 20 (3) 15 (0) 40 (3) 
Review for Downgrade 32 (9) 49 (10) 35 (4) 116 (23) 
Positive rating announcements 
Effective Upgrade 31 (5) 38 (8) 19 (2) 88 (15) 
Positive Outlook Assignment 4 (0) 16 (5) 5 (0) 25 (5) 
Review for Upgrade 6 (0) 23 (3) 13 (2) 42 (5) 
Total 148 (33) 205 (45) 129 (18) 482 (96) 
Note: Contaminated rating changes in parentheses 
 
Figure 1. Rating action announcements: distribution by year 
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Figure 2. Rating action announcements: distribution by issuer’s sector  
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Table 2. Improvements in credit quality: Constant volatility approach 
 Systematic risk Unsystematic risk 
Window CACB1 M-CCB1 AVR1 F-test S-T test B test M-VR1 Sign test Rank test 
Effective Upgrades  (N=73) 
[-30,30] -0.057 -0.011* 1.484 57.5% 47.9% 56.2% 0.884 46* 1.034 
[-15,15] 0.020 0.102 1.665 47.9% 31.5% 46.6% 0.741 49* 2.298* 
[-10,10] -0.038 0.068 1.842 52.1% 34.2% 49.3% 0.695 53* 3.436* 
[-5,5] 0.042 0.081 0.730 52.1% 23.3% 49.3% 0.533 52* 3.826* 
[-1,1] -0.032 0.034* 0.382 67.1% 41.1% 45.2% 0.091 66* 5.800* 
[-30,-1] -0.029 0.003 0.963 53.4% 34.2% 50.7% 0.831 44 2.655* 
[-15,-1] 0.049 0.070 0.906 53.4% 27.4% 52.1% 0.574 53* 3.463* 
[-10,-1] 0.054 0.140 0.791 52.1% 32.9% 46.6% 0.520 59* 4.266* 
[-5,-1] 0.074 0.129 0.476 64.4% 23.3% 49.3% 0.240 61* 5.349* 
[1,30] -0.035 0.006 1.812 58.9% 43.8% 60.3% 0.748 47* 2.073* 
[1,15] 0.117 0.235 2.108 57.5% 41.1% 46.6% 0.541 52* 3.595* 
[1,10] -0.094 0.085 2.366 52.1% 31.5% 42.5% 0.485 57* 4.794* 
[1,5] 0.062 0.173 0.516 56.2% 34.2% 38.4% 0.273 61* 5.399* 
Positive Outlook Reports  (N=37) 
[-30,30] -0.064 -0.068 0.812 64.9% 29.7% 64.9% 0.639 31* 3.530* 
[-15,15] -0.109 -0.018 0.882 54.1% 24.3% 54.1% 0.676 29* 2.987* 
[-10,10] -0.250* -0.278 0.886 56.8% 18.9% 45.9% 0.572 31* 3.606* 
[-5,5] -0.292 -0.183 1.053 54.1% 21.6% 40.5% 0.576 28* 2.942* 
[-1,1] -0.908 0.007 0.427 54.1% 37.8% 40.5% 0.102 33* 3.938* 
[-30,-1] -0.084 -0.021 0.870 62.2% 40.5% 54.1% 0.617 31* 3.379* 
[-15,-1] -0.162 -0.075 1.005 51.4% 21.6% 45.9% 0.603 29* 2.987* 
[-10,-1] -0.264* -0.079 0.953 54.1% 21.6% 40.5% 0.491 30* 3.847* 
[-5,-1] -0.780 -0.345 0.857 43.2% 29.7% 32.4% 0.393 31* 3.817* 
[1,30] -0.054 -0.034 0.645 64.9% 16.2% 59.5% 0.564 34* 4.179* 
[1,15] -0.064 -0.003 0.583 51.4% 24.3% 40.5% 0.542 34* 4.662* 
[1,10] -0.393* -0.219 0.518 48.6% 10.8% 43.2% 0.511 35* 4.722* 
[1,5] -0.454 -0.220 0.388 54.1% 24.3% 35.1% 0.268 36* 4.737* 
Review for upgrades  (N=20) 
[-30,30] -0.037 -0.093 1.101 70.0% 60.0% 65.0% 0.802 14 0.728 
[-15,15] -0.094 -0.054 1.200 70.0% 55.0% 60.0% 0.679 12 0.205 
[-10,10] -0.239 -0.441 1.249 50.0% 25.0% 50.0% 0.732 12 0.616 
[-5,5] -0.392 -0.099 1.483 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 0.720 14 0.915 
[-1,1] -5.818 -0.254 1.062 65.0% 25.0% 40.0% 0.123 17* 2.333* 
[-30,-1] -0.037 -0.011* 0.854 60.0% 50.0% 55.0% 0.704 14 1.699* 
[-15,-1] -0.174 0.001* 0.886 50.0% 25.0% 35.0% 0.702 14 0.952 
[-10,-1] -0.628 0.005 0.772 40.0% 30.0% 40.0% 0.652 15* 1.549 
[-5,-1] -0.765 -0.352 0.471 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 0.306 18* 3.155* 
[1,30] 0.023 -0.029 1.253 65.0% 40.0% 65.0% 0.822 13 0.616 
[1,15] 0.093 -0.091 1.303 60.0% 55.0% 55.0% 0.601 14 1.587 
[1,10] -0.091 -0.153 1.400 40.0% 25.0% 35.0% 0.554 16* 2.296* 
[1,5] -0.307 0.243 1.337 45.0% 25.0% 40.0% 0.419 16* 2.184* 
Note: In all cases, * indicates rejection of the H0 that no effects due to rating actions at least to a 10% significance level. 
M-CCB1 is the median CCB1, and in this case * indicates rejection of H0 with the sign test and + indicates the same 
but with the rank test. F-test, ST-test and B-test are respectively F-variance ratio, Siegel-Tukey and Bartlett tests and 
the figures show the proportion of times that H0 is rejected individually. M-VR1 is the median of the variance ratio.  
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Table 3. Improvements in credit quality: GJR-GARCH volatility approach 
 Systematic Risk Unsystematic Risk 
Window CACB2 M-CCB2 AVR2 %>1 M-VR2 Sign-t R-test AVR2l % l=1 CHS-test 
Effective upgrades  (N=73) 
[-30,30] 0.004 -0.002* 1.164 49.3% 0.995 37 0.291 1.003 3.3% 1032.1 
[-15,15] 0.118 0.125 1.100 39.7% 0.925 44 2.369* 0.994 3.2% 807.5 
[-10,10] 0.098 0.133 1.347 31.5% 0.903 50* 2.996* 0.934 9.5% 513.0 
[-5,5] 0.111 0.124 0.830 34.2% 0.894 48* 3.507* 0.817 18.2% 1496.9 
[-1,1] 0.007 0.065 0.910 28.8% 0.885 52* 3.705* 0.387 0.0% 389.8 
[-30,-1] 0.011 0.006* 1.020 41.1% 0.961 43 1.726* 0.898 3.3% 1306.7 
[-15,-1] 0.059 0.079 1.034 39.7% 0.948 44 1.908* 0.834 6.7% 886.5 
[-10,-1] 0.097 0.163 1.008 30.1% 0.844 51* 3.507* 0.744 0.0% 387.8 
[-5,-1] 0.176 0.309 0.837 26.0% 0.850 54* 3.986* 0.548 0.0% 526.4 
[1,30] -0.003 0.028 2.044 37.0% 0.932 46* 1.875* 0.953 6.7% 753.3 
[1,15] 0.084 0.162 2.606 30.1% 0.908 51* 2.666* 0.858 6.7% 447.8 
[1,10] -0.058 0.141 2.958 31.5% 0.880 50* 3.051* 0.797 10.0% 208.1 
[1,5] 0.107 0.094 0.858 27.4% 0.850 53* 3.562* 0.590 0.0% 786.2 
Positive Outlook Reports  (N=37) 
[-30,30] -0.041 -0.067 0.907 27.0% 0.918 27* 2.942* 0.939 6.6% 713.8 
[-15,15] -0.080 -0.097 1.017 24.3% 0.896 28* 2.61* 0.923 9.7% 465.3 
[-10,10] -0.242* -0.163 1.014 21.6% 0.851 29* 3.349* 0.879 9.5% 318.7 
[-5,5] -0.292 -0.193 0.815 24.3% 0.805 28* 3.063* 1.073 9.1% 112.3 
[-1,1] -0.874 0.001 0.913 24.3% 0.870 28* 2.806* 0.510 0.0% 19173 
[-30,-1] -0.095 0.014 0.967 24.3% 0.861 28* 2.474* 0.924 13.3% 622.3 
[-15,-1] -0.078 -0.020 0.986 29.7% 0.904 26* 2.489* 0.943 0.0% 322.3 
[-10,-1] -0.225* -0.080 1.207 24.3% 0.909 28* 3.002* 0.785 10.0% 182.8 
[-5,-1] -0.602 -0.163 0.852 18.9% 0.838 30* 3.5* 0.820 0.0% 183.6 
[1,30] -0.022 -0.009 0.815 16.2% 0.866 31* 3.938* 0.811 13.3% 951.1 
[1,15] -0.014 0.037 0.818 8.1% 0.844 34* 4.254* 0.733 6.7% 505.1 
[1,10] -0.321* -0.156 0.835 10.8% 0.867 33* 4.103* 0.663 10.0% 386.3 
[1,5] -0.436 -0.167 0.976 18.9% 0.820 30* 3.032* 0.483 20.0% 764.2 
Review for upgrades  (N=20) 
[-30,30] 0.030 0.082 0.929 30.0% 0.942 14 1.96* 1.002 4.9% 202.7 
[-15,15] -0.060 -0.086 0.887 30.0% 0.831 14 1.587 1.314 3.2% 57.90 
[-10,10] -0.045 -0.186 1.320 45.0% 0.894 11 0.989 1.079 9.5% 100.4 
[-5,5] -0.040 0.107 1.438 35.0% 0.906 13 0.877 1.061 9.1% 173.8 
[-1,1] -4.675 -0.104 0.912 35.0% 0.901 13 1.101 0.978 0.0% 5771.0 
[-30,-1] -0.042 -0.062 0.887 30.0% 0.824 14 2.147* 1.031 13.3% 183.5 
[-15,-1] -0.104 0.227 0.830 30.0% 0.761 14 2.259* 1.026 6.7% 136.4 
[-10,-1] -0.515 -0.008 0.868 25.0% 0.759 15* 1.811* 0.945 10.0% 98.20 
[-5,-1] -0.740 -0.258 0.739 15.0% 0.719 17* 3.005* 0.599 0.0% 134.7 
[1,30] 0.119 0.023 0.885 25.0% 0.790 15* 1.325 1.067 3.3% 71.10 
[1,15] -0.025 0.034 2.909 25.0% 0.800 15* 1.176 1.106 13.3% 139.5 
[1,10] -0.086 -0.109 0.987 25.0% 0.825 15* 1.400 1.089 10.0% 18.60 
[1,5] -0.382 0.450 1.025 30.0% 0.854 14 1.363 1.089 20.0% 105.0 
Note: In all cases, * indicates rejection of the H0 that there are no effects due to the rating actions at least to a 10% 
significance level. M-CCB2 is the median CCB2, and in this case * indicates rejection of H0 with the sign test and + 
indicates the same but with the rank test. . % >1 indicate the proportion of times that the VR2 is greater than 1, M-
VR2 is the median VR2. AVR2l is the average l in equation (6), % l=1 is the proportion of times that the individual 
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H-S test for H0: l=1 is rejected and CHS-test is the cumulative H-S test.. 
 
Table 4. Improvements in credit quality: Dummy GJR-GARCH volatility approach 
 Systematic Risk Unsystematic Risk 
Window CACB3 M-CCB3 CACIR % CCIR≠0 M-CCIR Sign test Rank test 
Effective upgrades  (N=73) 
[-30,30] -0.028 -0.001*+ -0.624 79.5% 0.001 37 0.984 
[-15,15] 0.052 0.075+ -0.676 71.2% -0.028 44 1.853* 
[-10,10] 0.046 0.081+ -0.707 71.2% -0.029 48* 2.683* 
[-5,5] 0.057 0.051+ -0.819* 64.4% -0.068 46* 2.007* 
[-1,1] -0.001 0.096+ -1.478* 27.4% -0.672 65* 5.954* 
[-30,-1] 0.020 0.014+ -0.914* 72.6% -0.013 42 1.380 
[-15,-1] 0.061 0.030+ -0.993* 65.8% -0.074 52* 3.244* 
[-10,-1] 0.092 0.207+ -0.975* 50.7% -0.136 52* 4.013* 
[-5,-1] 0.177 0.283+ -1.444* 30.1% -0.484 59* 5.432* 
[1,30] -0.022 0.029+ -0.252 64.4% -0.022 46* 2.051* 
[1,15] 0.158 0.182+ -0.202 63.0% -0.068 49* 2.859* 
[1,10] -0.026 0.162 0.129 63.0% -0.142 51* 3.942* 
[1,5] 0.065 0.080+ -1.339* 39.7% -0.298 56* 4.546* 
Positive Outlook Reports  (N=37) 
[-30,30] -0.051 -0.062+ 0.052 83.8% -0.021 26* 1.494 
[-15,15] -0.072 -0.041+ -0.065 75.7% -0.013 22 0.875 
[-10,10] -0.196* -0.150+ 0.029 73.0% -0.025 25* 1.177 
[-5,5] -0.247 -0.185 0.187 70.3% -0.016 24* 0.754 
[-1,1] -0.570 0.000+ -0.388 24.3% -0.425 33* 3.696* 
[-30,-1] -0.051 -0.011+ -0.034 81.1% -0.048 27* 2.534* 
[-15,-1] -0.157 -0.069+ -0.237* 67.6% -0.072 24* 2.384* 
[-10,-1] -0.261* -0.134+ -0.092 67.6% -0.084 25* 2.338* 
[-5,-1] -0.622 -0.175+ -0.301 48.6% -0.179 30* 3.289* 
[1,30] -0.020 0.009*+ -0.12* 81.1% -0.019 24* 2.157* 
[1,15] -0.018 0.052*+ -0.244* 75.7% -0.070 28* 3.364* 
[1,10] -0.311* -0.113+ -0.297* 70.3% -0.087 32* 4.254* 
[1,5] -0.425 -0.187+ -0.668* 21.6% -0.334 34* 4.828* 
Review for upgrades  (N=20) 
[-30,30] -0.019 0.075+ -0.769 75.0% 0.034 11 0.168 
[-15,15] 0.079 -0.006+ -0.280 75.0% 0.086 13 0.989 
[-10,10] -0.034 -0.127 0.145 70.0% 0.051 12 0.616 
[-5,5] -0.306 -0.113+ -0.825 80.0% 0.034 11 0.205 
[-1,1] -5.006 -0.334+ -1.608 20.0% -1.154 17* 2.781* 
[-30,-1] 0.102 0.009+ -0.582 85.0% 0.031 11 0.691 
[-15,-1] -0.152 0.075+ -0.016 70.0% 0.037 13 1.027 
[-10,-1] -0.460 -0.002+ -0.439 65.0% -0.074 12 0.989 
[-5,-1] -0.704 -0.164+ -2.129 40.0% -0.381 18* 2.856* 
[1,30] 0.044 0.009*+ -0.743 70.0% -0.054 12 0.653 
[1,15] 0.013 -0.035+ -0.510 75.0% -0.113 12 1.027 
[1,10] -0.206 0.028+ -0.093 45.0% -0.146 15* 1.885* 
[1,5] -0.734 0.158+ -1.050 35.0% -0.252 14 1.624 
Note: In all cases, indicates rejection of the H0 that there are no effects due to the rating actions at least to a 10% 
significance level. M-CCB3 is the median CCB3, and in this case * indicates rejection of H0 with the sign test and + 
indicates the same but with the rank test. Figures in the % CCIR=0 column indicates the proportion of times the d 
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parameter is significant in model (7), and M-CCIR is the median CCIR 
 
Table 5. Deteriorations in credit quality: Constant volatility approach  
 Systematic risk Unsystematic risk 
Window CACB1 M-CACB1 AVR1 F test S-T test B test M-VR1 Sign-t Rank-t 
Effective downgrades  (N=126) 
[-30,30] 0.070 0.036 1.068 61.9% 49.2% 61.9% 0.769 78* 1.351 
[-15,15] 0.096* 0.058 1.160 59.5% 46.0% 57.1% 0.781 82* 1.373 
[-10,10] 0.082 0.076 1.134 55.6% 39.7% 54.0% 0.715 84* 2.445* 
[-5,5] 0.104 0.077 1.143 51.6% 34.9% 46.8% 0.654 91* 3.421* 
[-1,1] 0.225 0.189 0.488 69.8% 42.1% 44.4% 0.102 118* 7.867* 
[-30,-1] 0.099* 0.045 0.983 57.1% 38.1% 56.3% 0.742 84* 2.557* 
[-15,-1] 0.114 0.116 1.108 56.3% 32.5% 52.4% 0.612 84* 3.126* 
[-10,-1] 0.023 0.043 1.083 47.6% 29.4% 42.9% 0.587 89* 4.022* 
[-5,-1] 0.245 0.020 0.950 50.0% 24.6% 36.5% 0.354 103* 5.734* 
[1,30] 0.117* 0.019 0.974 55.6% 42.9% 54.0% 0.774 79* 2.459* 
[1,15] 0.161* 0.032 0.918 50.8% 31.0% 50.0% 0.615 89* 3.577* 
[1,10] 0.215* 0.095 0.824 54.0% 29.4% 42.9% 0.501 97* 5.313* 
[1,5] 0.132 -0.081 0.505 56.3% 22.2% 35.7% 0.279 109* 8.312* 
Negative Outlook Reports  (N=37) 
[-30,30] 0.245* 0.038 1.295 75.7% 40.5% 70.3% 0.870 22 0.332 
[-15,15] 0.376* 0.141 1.412 59.5% 43.2% 59.5% 0.863 20 0.498 
[-10,10] 0.513* 0.189 1.530 56.8% 37.8% 48.6% 0.890 22 0.407 
[-5,5] 0.584* 0.394 1.711 40.5% 27.0% 29.7% 0.914 22 0.136 
[-1,1] 0.120 0.057 1.009 59.5% 35.1% 35.1% 0.172 34* 4.164* 
[-30,-1] 0.282* 0.289 1.128 51.4% 27.0% 43.2% 0.748 24* 1.177 
[-15,-1] 0.337* 0.298 1.040 32.4% 13.5% 35.1% 0.789 25* 1.675* 
[-10,-1] 0.576* 0.448 1.002 40.5% 21.6% 35.1% 0.792 25* 1.81* 
[-5,-1] 0.846* 0.384 0.723 48.6% 29.7% 45.9% 0.400 27* 3.078* 
[1,30] 0.265* 0.087 1.043 51.4% 35.1% 56.8% 0.726 22 0.905 
[1,15] 0.427* 0.135 1.194 43.2% 32.4% 43.2% 0.768 21 0.000 
[1,10] 0.514* 0.193 1.169 45.9% 40.5% 48.6% 0.787 23 0.483 
[1,5] 0.603* 0.692 1.008 40.5% 27.0% 24.3% 0.458 26* 2.836* 
Review for downgrades  (N=93) 
[-30,30] 0.079 0.065 1.525 63.4% 46.2% 66.7% 1.138 54 3.065* 
[-15,15] 0.143* 0.104 1.632 52.7% 39.8% 54.8% 1.123 51 2.51* 
[-10,10] 0.18* 0.054 1.735 54.8% 38.7% 52.7% 1.092 53 2.487* 
[-5,5] 0.286* 0.007 1.863 49.5% 36.6% 52.7% 1.096 48 2.188* 
[-1,1] 0.733 0.195 1.665 49.5% 44.1% 44.1% 0.241 64* 2.889* 
[-30,-1] 0.038 0.057 1.340 45.2% 28.0% 46.2% 1.011 47 1.866* 
[-15,-1] 0.113 0.134 1.308 38.7% 31.2% 38.7% 0.863 54 0.268 
[-10,-1] 0.159* 0.105 1.339 36.6% 22.6% 30.1% 0.939 50 0.215 
[-5,-1] 0.296* 0.205 0.932 39.8% 21.5% 30.1% 0.543 63* 3.054* 
[1,30] 0.142* 0.101 1.166 57.0% 35.5% 55.9% 0.833 57* 1.038 
[1,15] 0.179* 0.136 1.149 43.0% 34.4% 45.2% 0.827 54 0.989 
[1,10] 0.228* 0.205 1.059 45.2% 30.1% 52.7% 0.692 61* 1.295 
[1,5] 0.326 0.045 0.980 50.5% 38.7% 43.0% 0.371 67* 2.782* 
Note: In all cases, * indicates rejection of the H0 that there are no effects due to the rating actions at least to a 10% 
significance level. M-CCB1 is the median CCB1, and in this case * indicates rejection of H0 with the sign test and + 
indicates the same but with the rank test. F-test, ST-test and B-test are the summarized names of the F-variance ratio, 
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Siegel-Tukey and Bartlett tests, respectively, and the figures show the proportion of times that H0 is rejected 
individually. M-VR1 is the median of the variance ratio.. 
 
Table 6. Deteriorations in credit quality: GJR-GARCH volatility approach 
 Systematic Risk Unsystematic Risk 
Window CACB2 M-CCB2 AVR2 %>1 M-VR2 Sign-t Rank-t AVR2l % l=1 CHS-test 
Effective downgrades  (N=126) 
[-30,30] 0.045 0.019 1.137 38.9% 0.927 77* 1.763* 0.975 6.6% 3736.4 
[-15,15] 0.063 0.090 1.077 34.1% 0.882 83* 1.831* 0.989 9.7% 2342.2 
[-10,10] 0.063 0.120 1.060 35.7% 0.885 81* 3.216* 0.965 4.8% 2003.1 
[-5,5] 0.102 0.022 1.181 32.5% 0.875 85* 2.958* 0.867 9.1% 1274.5 
[-1,1] 0.798 0.147 1.079 24.6% 0.818 95* 4.782* 0.385 0.0% 810.0 
[-30,-1] 0.101 0.046 1.149 32.5% 0.885 85* 2.873* 0.923 13.3% 1647.7 
[-15,-1] 0.159 0.075 1.013 29.4% 0.829 89* 3.813* 0.948 13.3% 1400.6 
[-10,-1] 0.023 0.023 1.007 30.2% 0.824 88* 4.047* 0.899 10.0% 815.9 
[-5,-1] 0.283 -0.033 1.142 24.6% 0.824 95* 4.719* 0.702 20.0% 256.9 
[1,30] 0.103 0.084 1.026 38.1% 0.921 78* 2.094* 0.938 10.0% 3898.0 
[1,15] 0.111 0.076 1.010 31.7% 0.870 86* 2.812* 0.886 6.7% 2321.1 
[1,10] 0.188* 0.081 0.971 29.4% 0.817 89* 3.572* 0.789 10.0% 1290.7 
[1,5] 0.117 -0.081 0.925 23.0% 0.763 97* 5.008* 0.545 0.0% 1007.3 
Negative Outlook Reports  (N=37) 
[-30,30] 0.233* 0.104 1.213 54.1% 1.025 20 0.619 1.005 6.6% 1090.7 
[-15,15] 0.36* 0.054 1.297 54.1% 1.015 20 0.709 1.007 6.5% 650.3 
[-10,10] 0.494* 0.263 1.373 48.6% 0.996 19 0.166 1.040 19.0% 407.8 
[-5,5] 0.588* 0.424 1.463 40.5% 0.956 22 0.392 1.094 9.1% 309.6 
[-1,1] -0.203 0.079 1.094 21.6% 0.885 29* 2.534* 0.431 0.0% 269.0 
[-30,-1] 0.193* 0.095 1.080 40.5% 0.977 22 0.588 0.969 6.7% 1002.7 
[-15,-1] 0.303* 0.268 1.054 35.1% 0.937 24* 1.177 0.889 0.0% 888.6 
[-10,-1] 0.579* 0.438 0.956 32.4% 0.879 25* 2.338* 0.905 0.0% 398.7 
[-5,-1] 0.837* 0.448 1.075 24.3% 0.898 28* 2.851* 0.651 0.0% 99.1 
[1,30] 0.275* 0.160 1.223 43.2% 0.988 21 0.211 0.930 10.0% 629.8 
[1,15] 0.443* 0.075 1.500 51.4% 1.003 19 0.694 0.894 6.7% 358.2 
[1,10] 0.542* 0.296 1.641 45.9% 0.941 20 0.196 0.818 10.0% 164.8 
[1,5] 0.575* 0.655 1.931 32.4% 0.907 25* 0.739 0.646 0.0% 298.3 
Review for downgrades  (N=93) 
[-30,30] 0.103 0.037 1.349 60.2% 1.061 56* 3.015* 1.053 3.3% 1052.5 
[-15,15] 0.133* 0.039 1.438 59.1% 1.042 55* 2.46* 1.082 3.2% 374.4 
[-10,10] 0.185* 0.061 1.511 59.1% 1.062 55* 3.015* 1.098 4.8% 235.8 
[-5,5] 0.529* 0.169 1.510 54.8% 1.049 51 2.33* 1.090 9.1% 162.3 
[-1,1] 0.782 0.262 1.246 38.7% 0.902 57* 0.034 0.764 0.0% 538.1 
[-30,-1] 0.051 0.031 1.195 52.7% 1.015 49 1.165 1.105 13.3% 1516.8 
[-15,-1] 0.139 0.074 1.186 41.9% 0.970 54 0.027 1.063 20.0% 583.6 
[-10,-1] 0.218* 0.129 1.197 44.1% 0.967 52 0.843 1.087 10.0% 616.0 
[-5,-1] 0.534* 0.180 1.127 35.5% 0.904 60* 1.218 0.805 0.0% 129.1 
[1,30] 0.146* 0.077 1.292 51.6% 1.003 48 1.253 0.895 10.0% 1792.3 
[1,15] 0.202* 0.144 1.437 51.6% 1.038 48 1.946* 0.836 13.3% 687.2 
[1,10] 0.236* 0.244 1.545 55.9% 1.023 52 2.142* 0.726 0.0% 674.5 
[1,5] 0.269 0.132 1.656 49.5% 0.993 47 1.766* 0.607 0.0% 634.0 
Note: In all cases, * indicates rejection of the H0 that there are no effects due to the rating actions at least to a 10% 
significance level. M-CCB2 is the median CCB2, and in this case * indicates rejection of H0 with the sign test and + 
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indicates the same but with the rank test. . % >1 indicate the proportion of times that the VR2 is greater than 1, M-
VR2 is the median VR2. AVR2l is the average l in equation (6), % l=1 is the proportion of times that the individual 
H-S test for H0: l=1 is rejected and CHS-test is the cumulative H-S test.. 
 
Table 7. Deteriorations in credit quality: Dummy GJR-GARCH volatility approach 
 Systematic Risk Unsystematic Risk 
Window CACB3 M-CCB3 CACIR % CCIR≠0 M-CIR Sign test Rank test 
Effective downgrades  (N=126) 
[-30,30] 0.049 0.038+ 0.056 76.2% 0.007 68 0.757 
[-15,15] 0.078 0.092 0.133 78.6% -0.008 65 0.105 
[-10,10] 0.059 0.084+ 0.004 68.3% -0.052 77* 1.609 
[-5,5] 0.100 0.029+ -0.189 56.3% -0.174 84* 3.767* 
[-1,1] 0.868 0.224+ -1.635* 24.6% -1.292 11* 8.188* 
[-30,-1] 0.051 0.02+ -0.068 76.2% -0.005 65 0.550 
[-15,-1] 0.101 0.113 0.137 68.3% -0.055 76* 1.551 
[-10,-1] -0.009 -0.003* 0.139 61.1% -0.123 83* 3.036* 
[-5,-1] 0.283 -0.045 0.443 44.4% -0.390 97* 5.78* 
[1,30] 0.094 0.056+ 0.017 77.8% -0.026 69 0.743 
[1,15] 0.138* 0.082+ -0.149 65.9% -0.073 78* 2.116* 
[1,10] 0.181* 0.099+ -0.258* 51.6% -0.199 90* 4.176* 
[1,5] 0.128 -0.088+ -0.977* 38.9% -0.506 10* 7.185* 
Negative Outlook Reports  (N=37) 
[-30,30] 0.208* 0.035+ 0.075 73.0% -0.033 20 0.136 
[-15,15] 0.329* 0.032+ -0.007 73.0% 0.003 19 0.091 
[-10,10] 0.504* 0.295+ -0.060 64.9% -0.011 19 0.241 
[-5,5] 0.526* 0.473 0.140 64.9% 0.000 19 0.151 
[-1,1] 0.001 0.16+ -1.223* 18.9% -1.079 34* 4.435* 
[-30,-1] 0.197* 0.161+ -0.169 81.1% -0.020 21 0.709 
[-15,-1] 0.31* 0.289+ -0.238* 73.0% -0.111 24* 2.429* 
[-10,-1] 0.615* 0.447+ -0.302* 64.9% -0.047 21 1.614 
[-5,-1] 0.898* 0.393+ -0.612* 35.1% -0.483 29* 3.259* 
[1,30] 0.238* 0.155+ -0.048 73.0% -0.029 24* 0.815 
[1,15] 0.505* 0.067+ -0.296* 75.7% -0.106 24* 1.931* 
[1,10] 0.594* 0.183+ -0.284* 67.6% -0.114 25* 2.037* 
[1,5] 0.666* 0.773+ -0.376* 51.4% -0.312 28* 3.425* 
Review for downgrades  (N=93) 
[-30,30] 0.082 0.028+ 0.075 83.9% 0.024 59* 1.824* 
[-15,15] 0.14* 0.070 0.347* 83.9% 0.050 52 2.663* 
[-10,10] 0.176* 0.068 0.439* 80.6% 0.083 58* 2.709* 
[-5,5] 0.374* 0.106 0.689* 69.9% 0.107 53 1.797* 
[-1,1] 0.673 0.054+ -0.389 24.7% -0.895 69* 3.713* 
[-30,-1] 0.055 0.063 0.298* 82.8% 0.082 55* 2.786* 
[-15,-1] 0.137 0.087 0.406* 81.7% -0.002 47 1.249 
[-10,-1] 0.221* 0.190 0.443* 71.0% 0.047 53 0.927 
[-5,-1] 0.417* 0.218+ 0.003 50.5% -0.287 59* 3.008* 
[1,30] 0.156* 0.109+ -0.162* 69.9% -0.053 56* 1.77* 
[1,15] 0.147* 0.122+ -0.049 65.6% -0.097 61* 1.521 
[1,10] 0.236* 0.18+ -0.218 52.7% -0.251 66* 3.579* 
[1,5] 0.295 0.199+ -0.653* 32.3% -0.732 75* 4.797* 
Note: In all cases, indicates rejection of the H0 that there are no effects due to the rating actions at least to a 10% 
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significance level. M-CCB3 is the median CCB3, and in this case * indicates rejection of H0 with the sign test and + 
indicates the same but with the rank test. Figures in the % CCIR=0 column indicates the proportion of times the d 
parameter is significant in model (7), and M-CCIR is the median CCIR. 
 
 Table 8. Determinants of abnormal risks 
 Improvements in credit quality  Deteriorations in credit quality 
 [-1, 1] [1, 30]  [-1, 1] [1, 30] 
 Systematic  Unsystematic Systematic Unsystematic  Systematic  Unsystematic Systematic  Unsystematic 
Constant 1.54 -2.173* -0.038 -0.567  -0.103 -1.867* -0.045 -0.022 
 (0.511) (0.026) (0.807) (0.493)  (0.941) (0.003) (0.696) (0.875) 
Review  -5.461 -0.143 -0.025 -0.511  -0.049 1.283* 0.12 -0.151 
 (0.198) (0.951) (0.908) (0.8)  (0.962) (0.009) (0.254) (0.228) 
Outlook reports -1.217 0.961 -0.024 -0.005  -0.716 0.473 0.21 -0.008 
 (0.287) (0.124) (0.857) (0.992)  (0.517) (0.314) (0.19) (0.95) 
Moody's -1.005 1.297 0.094 0.798  -0.033 -0.479 0.024 -0.28* 
 (0.539) (0.143) (0.501) (0.413)  (0.974) (0.278) (0.805) (0.007) 
One agency -2.05 -1.022 0.147 -0.483  2.565 -0.637 0.024 -0.322 
 (0.364) (0.378) (0.679) (0.387)  (0.242) (0.239) (0.925) (0.298) 
Expected -1.089 0.909 -0.314* 0.584  1.001 0.441 0.155 0.028 
 (0.405) (0.414) (0.039) (0.584)  (0.349) (0.371) (0.104) (0.777) 
Consensus -12.96 -1.234 -0.183 -1.335  1.851 1.017 -0.156 0.288 
 (0.217) (0.811) (0.576) (0.749)  (0.311) (0.25) (0.283) (0.168) 
Financial Sector 1.018 -0.348 0.244* -0.33  -0.348 0.023 0.014 0.266* 
 (0.319) (0.464) (0.071) (0.358)  (0.703) (0.959) (0.882) (0.019) 
R2 0.166 0.051 0.055 0.017  0.017 0.049 0.018 0.074 
Obs. 130 130 130 130  256 256 256 256 
Note: In all cases, * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level in a two-tailed test 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Deteriorations in credit quality – 2007 financial crisis effect 
 Before August 2007  After August 2007 
 [-1, 1] [1, 30]  [-1, 1] [1, 30] 
 Systematic  Unsystematic Systematic Unsystematic  Systematic  Unsystematic Systematic  Unsystematic 
Constant -0.733 -1.563* -0.118 -0.117  0.416 -4.071* 0.035 0.152 
 (0.659) (0.039) (0.371) (0.399)  (0.539) (0.022) (0.902) (0.795) 
Review  0.413 0.798 0.235* -0.073  -0.99* 3.021* -0.252 -0.257 
 (0.747) (0.18) (0.055) (0.557)  (0.063) (0.001) (0.257) (0.436) 
Outlook reports -0.855 -0.176 0.29 -0.014  0.737 4.042* -0.335 0.386 
 (0.515) (0.719) (0.102) (0.92)  (0.384) (0.021) (0.215) (0.452) 
Moody's 0.599 0.187 -0.002 -0.127  -1.15* -2.31* 0.303 -0.751* 
 (0.661) (0.712) (0.988) (0.202)  (0.035) (0.004) (0.128) (0.013) 
One agency 2.439 -0.922 -0.033 -0.332  0.982* -2.76* 0.712* -0.718* 
 (0.315) (0.124) (0.904) (0.331)  (0.048) (0.00) (0.00) (0.012) 
Expected 1.484 0.502 0.194* 0.032  0.384 1.023 0.124 0.085 
 (0.262) (0.374) (0.08) (0.752)  (0.397) (0.478) (0.568) (0.823) 
Consensus 1.958 1.152 -0.186 0.271  0.416 0.082 -0.28 0.686 
 (0.33) (0.218) (0.229) (0.231)  (0.649) (0.935) (0.55) (0.168) 
Financial Sector 0.156 -0.059 0.104 0.293*  -0.059 1.84 -0.18 0.347 
 (0.897) (0.92) (0.408) (0.015)  (0.925) (0.105) (0.403) (0.444) 
R2 0.019 0.04 0.033 0.069  0.219 0.303 0.113 0.143 
Obs. 197 197 197 197  59 59 59 59 
Note: In all cases, * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level in two-tailed test. 
 
